The Prince by Niccolò Machiavelli

CONTEXT:

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli,
Born: May 3, 1469, Florence, Italy
Died: June 21, 1527, Florence, Italy

Italian Renaissance historian, politician, diplomat, philosopher, humanist, writer, and for many years a senior official in the Florentine Republic although never a citizen, with responsibilities in diplomatic and military affairs. He has often been called the founder of modern political science.

Born in a tumultuous era, he witnessed popes waging acquisitive wars against Italian city-states, proxy wars by France, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, and Switzerland who battled for regional influence and control. Political-military alliances continually changed. Condottieri (mercenary leaders) switched sides without warning, as many short-lived governments rose and fell. Powerful families like the Orsinis, Sforzas, Borgias and Medicis struggled to get and keep power in this unstable environment. Most notably he was a Florentine diplomat to the infamous Cesare Borgia (1475–1507) and his father, Pope Alexander VI tried to bring a large part of Central Italy under their possession using brutal but practical state-building methods under the pretext of defending the Church which he wrote about in "The Prince."

By the beginning of "The Prince" in 1512, the Republic of Florence had fallen to the Medicis to whom he dedicated the work. Machiavelli was imprisoned and tortured, but released. He was never able to re-enter politics or have the influence he once wielded, and died on his estates in exile in 1527.

CONTENT:

The opening dedication is to Lorenzo de Medici offering Machiavelli's advice to the prince in plain language the conduct of great men and the principles of princely government.

The book's 26 chapters can be divided into five sections:

• Chapters 1-11 discuss the different types of principalities or states:

1. Hereditary principalities, which are inherited by the ruler
2. Mixed principalities, territories that are annexed to the ruler's existing territories
3. New principalities, which may be acquired by several methods: by one's own power, by the power of others, by criminal acts or extreme cruelty, or by the will of the people (civic principalities)
4. Ecclesiastical principalities, namely the Papal States belonging to the Catholic church.

• Chapters 12-14 discuss the different types of armies and the proper conduct of a prince as military leader.

1. Mercenaries or hired soldiers, which are dangerous and unreliable
2. Auxiliaries, troops that are loaned to you by other rulers—also dangerous and unreliable
3. Native troops, composed of one's own citizens or subjects—by far the most desirable kind
4. Mixed troops, a combination of native troops and mercenaries or auxiliaries—still less desirable than a completely native army

• Chapters 15-23 discuss the character and behavior of the prince

1. It is better to be stingy than generous.
2. It is better to be cruel than merciful.
3. It is better to break promises if keeping them would be against one's interests.
4. Princes must avoid making themselves hated and despised;
   the goodwill of the people is a better defense than any fortress.
5. Princes should undertake great projects to enhance their reputation.
6. Princes should choose wise advisors and avoid flatterers.

• Chapters 24-26 discuss Italy's desperate political situation

1. The rulers of Italy have lost their states by ignoring the political and military principles Machiavelli enumerates.
2. Fortune controls half of human affairs, but free will controls the rest, leaving the prince free to act. However, few princes can adapt their actions to the times.

• The final chapter is a plea for the Medici family to supply the prince who will lead Italy out of humiliation and foreign control (and presumably get Machiavelli a job).

QUOTES

Chapter 3

• although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives.
  
• conquering rulers must inevitably injure those they conquer.
  
• men must be either pampered or annihilated. They avenge light offenses; they cannot avenge severe ones; hence, the harm one does to a man must be such as to obviate any fear of revenge.
  
• It is important to deal with developing political problems early, rather than wait until it is too late, because wars can never be avoided, only postponed to your disadvantage.

Chapter 6

• The people are fickle, and when they no longer believe in you, you must force them to believe.
  
• There is nothing more dangerous or less like to succeed than to be the leader of change; everyone who profited and became powerful under the old order will fight you passionately, and people who would profit from change will only offer lukewarm support until they have proof it works.

Chapter 7

• The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws.

Chapter 8

• when a prince decides to seize a state, he must determine how much injury to inflict. He needs to strike all at once and then refrain from further atrocities. In this way, his subjects will eventually forget the violence and cruelty. Gradually, resentment will fade, and the people will come to appreciate the resulting benefits of the prince’s rule.
  
• Most important, a prince should be consistent in the way he treats his subjects.

Chapter 14

• A prince must have no other objective, no other thought, nor take up any profession but that of war, its methods and its discipline, for that is the only art expected of a ruler. And it is of such great value that it not only keeps hereditary princes in power, but often raises men of lowly condition to that rank

Chapter 15

• Cruelty and other vices should not be pursued for their own sake, just as virtue should not be pursued for its own sake: virtues and vices should be conceived as means to an end. Every action the prince takes must be considered in light of its effect on the state, not in terms of its intrinsic moral value.

Chapter 16

• A reputation for generosity is thought to be desirable, but it can be dangerous; because you must be seen spending lavishly. To support this habit, a prince must raise taxes and squeeze money from his subjects. Generosity of this sort benefits few and harms many. The prince's subjects will hate him, and no one will respect him because he is poor. Therefore, a wise prince will not mind being called a miser, because stinginess is a vice that allows him to reign.
  
• If a prince is giving away other people's property, he can afford to be generous, but if he is giving away his own resources, he will become grasping and hated or poor and despised.

Chapter 17

• No prince should mind being called cruel for keeping his subjects peaceful and loyal. Punishing a few, and thus averting disorder, is better than allowing troubles to develop that will hurt many. New rulers cannot avoid seeming cruel, because their states are insecure. Still, a prince should not be too rash or too fearful.
  
• above all things a prince must keep his hands off the property of others, because people will sooner forget the death of a father than the loss of an inheritance.
  
• it would best to be both loved and feared. But since the two rarely come together, anyone compelled to choose will find greater security in being feared than in being loved. . . . Love endures by a bond which men, being scoundrels, may break whenever it serves their advantage to do so; but fear is supported by the dread of pain, which is ever present.
  
• people love as they wish, but fear at the prince's will, so a wise ruler will rely on what he can best control.

Chapter 18

• Be it known, then, that there are two ways of contending, one in accordance with the laws, the other by force; the first of which is proper to men, the second to beasts. But since the first method is often ineffectual, it becomes necessary to resort to the second.
  
• The lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten wolves.
  
• have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if constrained.

Chapter 19

• A prince must avoid becoming hated or despised. Taking the property or the women of his subjects will make him hated. Being frivolous, indecisive, and weak will make him despised. All a prince's actions should show seriousness, strength, and decisiveness. The best defense against internal threats or conspiracies is to be neither hated nor despised. If a conspirator thinks that killing the prince will enrage the people, he will think twice.
  
• Princes should let others do the unpleasant tasks, doing for themselves what will make them look good.
  
• nearly all Roman Emperors were killed regardless of their qualities and actions. Some did one thing and others did the opposite, but all came to basically the same end. The key to their success or failure is whether they adapted their actions to their times and political circumstances. 

Chapter 22

• There are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.

Chapter 24

• men are attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things